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The most successful instance of interactive music is Karaoke, a Japanese pub 
entertainment which (like “music minus one” of yore) supplies recorded rendi- 
tions of your favorite songs minus the lead singer, which part, prompted by your 
sloshed cohorts, you take. “Karaoke” means “empty orchestra”: the general 
principle is to provide media with an empty space in which to insert yourself. It is 
extensible to, for instance, the movies; like Bob Hoskins in Who Framed Roger 
Rabbit?, you’d be inserted into a landscape complete with floating props you’d 
need to learn to “grasp”; you’d have to situate yourself where your co-stars 
expected you to be; you’d trade off lines (with Marilyn or Arnold), which might 
bounce across the screen (Karaoke-style) so that you’d get the timing right. 
One of Karaoke’s apparent limitations is that the surrounding medium is 
completely “unaware” of you; it makes no adjustments if you can’t carry the 
tune, or if it’s in a bad key, or too fast or too slow for your liking. More 
“cognitive” forms of Karaoke are thinkable, and rudimentary systems have been 
devised that try to track both base tempo and rubato, the subtle variations in 
tempo that serve musical expression. But developments like these seem contrary 
to the spirit of Karaoke, which involves mastering the recording, rather than the 
other way around; the point is not to offer original interpretations but to sound 
like Elvis. There’s something to this. Karaoke poignantly dramatizes the enter- 
tainment media’s (or society’s, or even life’s) uncaring attitude towards the 
dreams of countless crushed aspirants to the entertainment calling-the music 
goes on with you or without you, and you clamor after it to secure the illusion 
that you lead, and that life follows you; but everyone knows, naturally, that it’s 
just the other way around. There’s some basic poetry in that, which, I don’t 
doubt, contributes to Karaoke’s appeal, especially in Japan. The cognitive 
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machine trailing after you is. by comparison, merely corny prose, a kind of 
technological kitsch: life isn’t really like that at all. 
With this brief introduction to interactive media I mean to draw attention to a 
simple fact about the arts, whether high or low: the technological medium, far 
from being a neutral “tool”. inevitably impinges on the significance, sensibility, or 
“meaning” of those arts it bears upon-as McLuhan said 30 years ago, “The 
medium is the message”. The “effects” of media are to some extent-and perhaps 
entirely-independent of the content they transmit. You can’t apply new technol- 
ogy-cognitive accompaniment systems. in the example above-to an older 
form-Karaoke-without affecting content, the perceptions brought about by the 
medium: without, in fact, changing the nature of medium itself. 
AI isn’t generally thought of as media; but the oldest of AI visions, namely the 
Turing Test Conversationalist, would seem to be the elusive ideal of interactive 
systems. Consider the following approximate analysis of the desiderata of such a 
system: 
(1) No systemic limitation belies the system‘s machine origin. 
(2) The system is not merely reactive: it can initiate discourse. 
(3) The performance of the system should be indistinguishable from human 
performance. 
Now consider how Eliza satisfies these desiderata. Eliza: 
(1) conceals systemic limitations to parse simple sentences by the method of 
“randomized interjections” (“Please go on”, “Earlier you mentioned your 
mother”); 
(2) mitigates its inability to converse non-reactively by choosing a conversa- 
tional idiom. namely “Rogerian therapy”. which is supposed to emphasize 
reactivity; 
(3) can seem to be human. if expectations are appropriately adjusted; some 
psychotherapists aren’t very good listeners. and don’t have much to say. 
My point is not that Eliza somehow fails these desiderata; it is. rather. that AI 
(and by extension. interactive media) can be convincing when one performs 
certain base adjustments on one’s own expectations of what intelligence is-or 
what interactivity is. The leaner these expectations, the easier it is to realize the 
promise of artificial intelligence. With regards to music, the same is true: success 
is ensured to the extent that one’s musical expectations are adjusted to the 
capacities of one’s musical medium-a point I’ll return to later on. In fundamen- 
tal research, adjustments of that kind would rightly be scorned. The situation in 
the arts is more complicated. 
An idea left over from the last century is that Art is Truth (and perhaps 
fundamental research in some sense); great art is timeless, taking a stand against 
the vagaries of the moment. In the past few years this idea has been overruled by 
the counterclaim that art is only great when its ideology is enforced; what makes 
art seem great is, effectively. a kind of colonialism. The effect on the arts of this 
thinking has been an excruciatingly self-conscious form of meta-base-line revision- 
ism, which very nearly rules out any kind of claim to universal truth-colonialism 
in disguise, as it were. There seems in this to be some parallel with Weizenbaum’s 
later repudiation of Eliza. 
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At its best, anti-colonialism (and the de-universalisation of art) promotes 
sensitivity to variants of thought and culture. At its worst, it promotes a tendency 
to avoid commitment to any strong, even any particular set of ideas. Any strong 
universal claim, anticolonialism holds, is likely to reinforce older oppressive 
ideologies and is, therefore, to be avoided. Even weaker, semi-universal claims 
are met with a sidelong glance at previously depreciated cultures, so as to tally 
exemptions; virtually no claim is put forward without apologies. Well-meaning 
though it may be, this tendency can be exasperating. It provides easy cover for 
those who never had strong commitments; it confuses the absence of vigorous 
theorization with tactfulness; it justifies wishy-washiness. 
The cognitive analysis of music ought to be a fascinating and deep subject-as 
deep as the deepest music. When the anti-colonial cognitive analyst refuses, for 
the reasons above, to commit himself-or, as Robert Rowe would say, herself- 
to any particular music, the subject finds itself without an object of study. Music 
has disappeared in a receding series of base-line adjustments. What’s left to be 
said? For our answer we turn to Interactive Music Systems. 
1. Cypher: an interactive music system 
To begin with, a brief overview of the book. An introduction develops the 
author’s conception of interactivity. A chapter on fundamentals discusses many of 
the practical problems involved; examples are presented in a music-programming 
language called MAX. “Live Computer Music” introduces the reader to the 
author’s interactive system, called Cypher, and summarizes other systems. 
“Machine Listening” describes the listening component of Cypher in detail; 
“Machine Composition” describes some different approaches to its subject, 
concentrating, again, on Cypher. “Interactive Architectures and Artificial In- 
telligence” reviews Cypher, and describes other approaches to listening and 
composition, involving production systems, connectionism, knowledge repre- 
sentation, pattern processing, and finally induction. A final chapter describes the 
leading edge of interactivity; and an accompanying CD supplies programs and 
excerpts of compositions-all produced by men, I might add-demonstrating their 
use. 
This discussion of Interactive Music Systems is restricted to the original research 
it presents, namely that incorporated into the design of Cypher. The model of 
interactivity is conversational, and tries to conform to the approximate desiderata 
listed above; the idea is to build an “artificial musician” that plays along with live 
musicians. The musical style involved, though not specified as such, is “free- 
atonal”. The inclusion of a rudimentary harmony-analyzer and beat-detector 
would suggest wider musical rein; but the analytic machinery is far too primitive 
to support improvisation of tonal music. 
Cypher consists of three modules: a listener that’s meant to produce “cognitive- 
style” analyses of incoming MIDI signals; a performer that lets the real performer 
make sequencing patches triggered by analytical output of the listener; and a critic 
that applies “esthetic” production rules to the output of the listener before actual 
performance. A MIDI instrument is connected to the system. with MIDI output 
directed to the listener; the performer generates MIDI input. The effect is that 
Cypher “plays along” with the live performer. 
2. Listeners 
The inclusion of the listener and critic is the interesting feature of Cypher. The 
idea. in principle. is to replace the coin-flipping algorithms of early music 
composition systems with a cognitive listening simulation that produces and 
evaluates representations of music; such simulations, in principle, would be able 
to answer questions like “what does this sound like?” and “does this sound 
right?” With such a module, a program that composed music would have a basis 
for evaluating its own productions-and not merely with respect to stylistic 
constraints. The composition program could. through the listener, construct 
musical plans--calculating musical expectancies and developing music, tested 
through the simulation, which, depending on the plan chosen, would promote the 
satisfaction or violation of these expectancies. 
In my own work on computational listening [I] I emphasized the problem of 
modeling processes of listening: 1 believe that music can be evaluated with respect 
to the questions above only by reference to some such inferred process. This is to 
be distinguished from the idea that music can be evaluated-that is, musically 
appreciated-exclusively with reference to a set of normative, or stylistic, 
constraints. Style. after all. is inferred; but the processes by which style is inferred 
need not themselves be inferable. The problem of artificial intelligence, in this 
case, is to model the inferring mechanisms. Thanks to the fact that music 
possesses no semantics-which is not to say that music has no associative 
power-music may be the optimal field in which to study problems like these. 
Rowe’s listener/critic is less ambitious. The conception of a listening simula- 
tion/composition planner alliance. far from being hinted at in Cypher, is 
completely overlooked. In part this might be attributed to the fact that Cypher 
possesses no real composition unit, and therefore no capacity to form plans. But 
the fact that Rowe’s approach differs from that just described ought not to be a 
point of criticism. Let us see what his listener does. 
2.1. The listener: level one 
The listener is hierarchical, consisting of two levels. Level one classified 
incoming MIDI events with respect to six features, namely: 
(1) registral classification decides whether notes are low or high (some in- 
between classifications are also admitted when the range is big enough); 
(2) dynamic classification decides whether notes are loud or soft; 
(3) “vertical density” decides whether notes are constituents of a chord, that is 
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“attack speed” decides whether notes are slow or fast (with some in- 
between values); 
durational classification decides whether notes are long or short; 
finally, harmonic classification of notes by root and mode.’ 
The boundaries between all decisions are static, with the exception of registral 
classification. The plan here is to narrow in on the register, using a technique 
called “focus and decay”, which changes the measurement scale. The algorithm is 
to keep a record of the lowest note received; unless it is reconfirmed within a 
fixed allotment of time (5 seconds, in fact), you slide the effective low note 
upwards by a semitone. I’ll return to this below. 
This more or less describes level one of the listener. Rowe includes among his 
goals that of “fashioning a computer program able to listen to music” (p. 96) 
implementing a method “with plausible relations to human music processing”; the 
program is not, however, to be taken as a “simulation of what goes on in the 
mind”. Rather, Cypher provides at best “an existence proof that the tasks it 
accomplishes can be done this way”. This last statement seems tautological- 
especially since the “tasks it accomplishes” are not explicitly disentangled from a 
set of tasks it is meant to accomplish, how could the program fail to prove that it 
can do what it does? Rowe knows that Cypher will not stand as a cognitive 
simulation; I do him no disservice by discounting his disclaimers and showing why 
they are needed. 
Assuming, then, that level one classifications are intended to represent the 
computed outcome of some low-level stage of auditory processing, the question 
then is: what is being computed? Potentially something amounting to a first 
approximation of the sensory field, capturing its overall characteristics. But 
“overall characteristics” are in fact not captured at this stage, for the simple 
reason that each moment of analysis is computed independently of adjoining 
moments, in other words, in isolation from effects brought about by the sensory 
field. The sensitivity of a “loudness” receptor, such as would be posited by level 
one, would certainly be depreciated by continued raucous activity; that’s what 
sensory adaptation is all about. Loud sounds can leave you insensitive to very soft 
sounds; add to this the whole problem of masking, where one sound drowns out 
another. In other words, level one’s loudness receptor, by not compromising or 
adjusting its sensitization, is producing information that could be produced 
nowhere in the human auditory processing system, since no component of the 
human system has access to information independent of the effects of sensory 
adaptation. The effect is that Cypher reports “soft” where a human, at the 
relevant processing level, wouldn’t notice anything at all. 
The converse effect is that level one doesn’t notice things noticeable by any 
human; to be obvious about this, humans can discriminate a much wider range of 
1 The harmony classifier implements an algorithm developed elsewhere; given the program’s free- 
atonal musical orientation, as evinced by the examples on the CD, its inclusion in the program seems 
to me anomalous. 
loudness than level one provides. Assuming, as is the case here, that lower levels 
of auditory processing produce elementary or even binary distinctions, what then 
ensures the possibility of constructing more precise representations? Relational 
specification is one option; indeed music cognitive representations-I’d venture to 
suggest all cognitive representations-are relational. rather than absolute. With 
certain pathological exceptions anyone can say whether the second of two notes 
played on the piano is higher or lower than the first; but only people with good 
pitch memory can name the first note, and then only when they’ve heard it 
before. Level one’s classifications, however, are made with respect to a fixed 
scale; so they must dispose over something like a very gross equivalent of perfect 
pitch. without displaying the least sensitivity to the perception of relative 
characteristics. It doesn’t matter that level one is only able to name two notes, 
rather than, say, 88; the judgment is still absolute. The overall effect is that 
nothing lost through classification can ever be reconstituted; one consequence is 
that nothing can ever be recognized. 
Relative discrimination seems to be the province of the technique called “focus 
and decay”, which, Rowe suggests. should be extensible to features other than 
register, the only one for which it was implemented. “Focus” means taking the 
range of the music to lie within the highest and lowest pitch; “decay” means that 
if, after five seconds, no new extreme is detected, then the effective extreme 
slides towards the middle. Hence, if I strike the lowest key of the instrument 
connected to Cypher, that becomes the low end of the range; if I then play 
exclusively in the upper octave of the instrument, “decay” slides this limit a 
half-step to the right every five seconds. At that rate, assuming a distance of four 
octaves between the low key on the keyboard and the first note in the upper 
octave. it will take exactly four minutes for “decay” to catch up to me. Four 
minutes is a long time in music; it is the length of the entire first movement of J.S. 
Bach’s Third Brandenburg Concerto. 
The problem is that the adjustment scale should be dynamic, not static; five 
seconds can be too long to wait in some music. as with the not unimaginable 
example above; in other music, it may be not long enough. The specification of 
problems like this, deciding when it would be right to alter the adjustment scale, 
belong to the computational analysis of listening. I won’t suggest that a “non- 
cognitive” algorithm couldn’t be devised which improved on Rowe’s; I would like 
to suggest. however, that “cognitivity”. whereby perceptual operations would be 
directed by a higher-level analysis of representational hypotheses and supported 
by adequate low-level representations, may well be especially advantageous to the 
solution of tasks like these. 
2.2. Level two 
The second level of the hierarchy examines successions of features, reporting, 
essentially, on two things. The first is to say whether a “phrase boundary” has 
been detected; the second is to say whether each feature is behaving regularly or 
irregularly. 
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Unlike most of level one, level two must do things which can be tested.’ I say 
this with caution; musicians don’t always agree where phrase boundaries fall, 
even, sometimes, with music as apparently entrenched as Mozart’s There is no 
universal definition of phrase boundary, though musical arguments can be 
interpretively adduced, as it were. Clever phrasing can articulate previously 
ungrasped elements of deep musical structure; yet, with durable music, no single 
interpretation need exhaust the articulable possibilities of this structure. I agree, 
therefore, with Rowe that the location of “meaningful phrase groupings” (p. 
154), as he puts it, is one of the most difficult in music cognition; I’m not entirely 
sure that it’s a problem of the foremost rank. Grouping at the event level is, I 
think, a matter of far greater significance. 
Rowe defines phrases as “musical sequences, commonly from around two to 
ten seconds in duration, that cohere due to related harmonic, rhythmic, and 
textural behaviors.” Such sequences are detected by “looking for discontinuities 
in the output of the level-l feature agents” (p. 155). Agents contribute a fixed 
weight to a running score; when the score exceeds a magic number, a phrase is 
reported. The text is somewhat short on disclosing particulars of this operation; I 
therefore put Cypher to a few tests, the results of which didn’t favorably reflect on 
the algorithm3 In any case I could not correlate the behavior of Cypher’s phrase 
detector with my own. 
Regularity is a comparison of the number of identical with non-identical 
features, judgment passing to the side that wins. Regularity and phrase boundary 
detection are suggested as important components of directionality in music, not 
an unfair claim; but a direction-finder awaits some later implementation. 
This describes, more or less, the entire listener. As mentioned, it is meant as a 
“working procedural model” (p. 107) of a method (or theory, as it is later called) 
of listening, which would seem to be something like this: [Theory A:] music is 
processed hierarchically; the lower-level module performs feature analysis on 
incoming events; the higher-level module produces structural representations of 
groups of events, based on information provided by the unit below it. Both levels 
employ independent and interconnected agents. A somewhat stronger statement 
might be this: [Theory B]: those low-level classifications promoted by level one 
can be used to construct potentially powerful representations of musical structure. 
But much greater rigor would be needed to turn Theory A into Theory B; it’s 
uncertain whether an implementation of the latter would be any better at 
constructing powerful representations than is the present system. 
To say the least, Interactive Music systems is a bit short on its analysis of 
listening. It’s true, as Rowe says, that there’s no “generally agreed theory of what 
music listening is”; but that is because there’s barely any theory to agree or 
’ The exceptions are the harmony classifier and beat detection mechanism. 
3 I connected the “phrase” listener to the “phrase” player, which should cause the program to 
“announce the arrival of the boundary with an audible bang” (p. 192). As a simple test, I then played 
a middle C at a moderate and even rate and with a steady intensity. Taking a short pause and 
accenting the note ought to indicate a phrase boundary; response was negative. 
disagree with at all. Those holding center court at present, like Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff’s generative grammar of classical music, seem only contentiously to be 
theories of listening; rather. they tend to be theories of what is supposed to be 
regarded as normative behavior in restricted stylistic areas. Among the issues not 
tackled by the cognitive-recognitional approach to music is the possibility of some 
interesting relation between cognition and emotion-one which would have the 
cognitive architecture driven by a qualitative sensory dynamic. Freud suggested 
that the purpose of consciousness was to enable us to forget; the machinery of 
cognition would, on that account, be at odds with the swelter of sensation that is 
music, seeking redundancy in order to negate it. or, in the avant-garde, to allow 
the automatisms of perception to reveal themselves. Or again, perhaps music is 
some complex cognitive/sensory dance of opposing partners, a pairing of the 
limbic system and the neocortex. There is ample room for theorization even at 
this level of generality. The redundancy-seeking mechanism requires a schematic 
memory and some inferential predictive module that can construct analogical 
representations. There must be filtration mechanisms as well as scanning mecha- 
nisms that probe the sensory field for a hint of a datum whose permissible 
distortions corroborate some aspect of a higher-level representation. This is 
hardly exhaustive. 
Two papers are cited which suggest some of these possibilities, if not more. 
One, by Christopher Lischka, proposes the simulation of auditory imagery “in 
Piagetian terms, where sensorimotor schemata are interiorized in the develop- 
ment of an inner voice” (p. 237). Another, by Peter Beyls, describes a program 
that “develops opinions about the world in a musical sense, concerning both its 
own activity and the behavior of stimuli arriving from the outside world” (p. 224). 
I regret not feeling the influence of these fascinating ideas on Cypher’s listener. 
3. The player 
As mentioned, the results of the listener arc available to the performer, to 
which are available certain predehned transformational operations; the user 
selects configurations. No new transformations can be defined; thus Cypher, in 
this respect at least, offers much less power than does MAX. 
In general. the program transforms input from the listener. But if, after a while, 
no input is forthcoming, the program goes to work on its own output. Rowe calls 
this “introspection”; its purpose seems to be to make good the second of the 
desiderata listed earlier. 
4. The critic 
The second potentially interesting component of the system is the “critic” 
module whose function it would be. guessing from its name, to veto the 
publication of unacceptable material. Partly that seems to have been the 
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intention: the idea is to evaluate musical output, and especially to find “interest- 
ing” material. What counts as “interesting”, however, is nothing more than events 
beginning new phrases, or events sufficiently different from their neighbors. 
These are then sent back to the listener, “for another round of analysis and 
response”. The effect of doing so is not explained. 
The result is then run through a set of “aesthetic productions”. One production 
reduces “the vertical density of material being played at high speed” (p. 203). 
Another rule is “if the music is loud, then trill high notes”. There seems to be 
some confusion between “aesthetic preference” and “arbitrary rules”; the author 
states, “there is no inherent reason to find any musical event more interesting 
than any other” (p. 202). Perhaps what’s meant is that without an underlying 
representation, no musical event is more interesting than any other; the question 
then is whether the author believes that there is no inherent reason to find any 
representational architecture more interesting than any other. I would hope not. 
The inclusion of the “critic” in this system is, on the whole, a blunder. The 
production rules can hardly count as anything even vaguely approximating 
aesthetics by any description. Furthermore, criticism might (and, I think, should) 
have been given much wider import, at, for instance, the level of sensory 
adaptation or habituation; the induction of underlying structure, whatever 
purpose it serves, almost certainly involves a generate-and-test ubsystem. At that 
level the system should certainly be capable of rapidly evaluating a chain of 
perceptual inferences, possibly in the manner of Beyls’ program. Assigning a 
cognitive or emotional calling to the “critic” module merely sullies the sense in 
which these terms are presumably to be taken. Things should be called by their 
proper names, said Confucius, and in this case “post-processor” would have done 
nicely. 
5. The music 
Theoretically, the music produced by a system of this description should be the 
proof of the pudding, or so, I think, would maintain the AI community at large. 
But this is not quite so. The reason, in part, has to do with the past 70 or 80 years 
of music, especially derivatives of “classical” music, the effect of which has been 
to render the idea of consensus utterly alien to musical activity. The legacy of 
“difficult” music-for twenty years there existed barely any other kind in the 
academic music world-is a sometime reversal of evaluative poles in conscientious 
musicians, who take music that seems to demand an entirely alien set of ears as a 
challenge to their powers of musical orientation, not to say perceptual discrimina- 
tion. Further, the legacy of “serial” music-a music that emphasizes pure 
combinative structure, demands a radical reorientation of the listening apparatus 
and was once the official music of academic musical circles-is something of a 
literary bond between intended and “heard” structure. That may still be largely 
true in the world of computer-generated music, where knowing how something 
was produced is something of an enhancement of the aesthetic experience. This is 
to say that the interest of Rowe’s music need not be separated from whatever 
interest Cypher itself arouses. 
A simpler way to think about this matter is through the problem of authentici- 
ty. Announcing the discovery of an unknown piano sonata by Beethoven will 
excite great interest in musical connoiseurs. It happens, both in the music and art 
worlds that a subsequent disclosure that the work is a contemporary forgery has 
the effect of completely dispelling interest. What if the work were generated by a 
computer program? Interest might be renewed, though for reasons other than 
musical connoiseurship and the aura of Beethoven’s genius. Now, what if the 
program in question produced the work by especially uninteresting means, say by 
recombining fragments of Beethoven’s works? This is precisely what David 
Cope’s recombinative-music program does; my interest was immediately and 
utterly voided the moment I understood how it worked (Rowe, too, is short on 
Cope). In other words, music automatically produced is often as interesting as the 
system that produced it; the system is often more interesting. To conclude this 
wrap-up of machine aesthetics. extremely uninteresting systems can produce 
interesting music and extremely uninteresting music can be produced by excep- 
tionally interesting machines, just as extremely interesting music can sound very 
bad, and very good-sounding music can sometimes be extremely uninteresting. 
Music, like all of the arts, can be a very confusing field. 
Therefore, when Rowe says that “the work described here . has been used 
with human musicians in a wide variety of settings over a period of several years” 
(p. 98), I fully accept this as the justification for what he does; I know that 
Cypher can perform much better than it did in my own study. Rowe’s work is 
nothing if not honest; I know then. that he would not disagree with me that 
music. sometimes, is the richest and purest cognitive architecture available; and 
that our machines will have a lot to live up to. 
6. Conclusions 
Interactive Music Systems might provide a handy reference to those interested 
in interactive music systems, with a few reservations. 
First, the musical field to which the book pertains is narrow, relating essentially 
to the kind of music promoted at international festivals of computer music. This 
narrowing of interest, naturally. is Rowe’s prerogative, but it poses some hazards 
which, I believe, he does not successfully meet. The foremost of these is that the 
theory of this music is not explicated-not to suggest it could be-but without 
some such explication the “theory” that is Cypher must collapse into a chimera. 
“Music theory”, says Rowe, “has always addressed the question of how humans 
experience music” (p. 95). This, incidentally, is an extremely moot point-music 
theory is more about how an ideal listener could compute musical structure-but 
if that’s Rowe’s understanding, what, then. is his experience of his own 
compositions, both as composer and as listener‘? What goals (if any) does he form 
as he composes‘? What structure does he compute-or emote-when listening? 
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What constitutes, in his own mind, the distinction between an adequate and an 
inadequate passage? These questions-admittedly hard ones-can only be an- 
swered by composer/theorists like Rowe. His answers could serve as the basis of 
a theory of some kind; it might fail universality, but others might decide that for 
themselves. Instead, the problem of musical experience is deflected to a few 
standards of the (tonal) music-theoretical literature which support the thesis that 
music is processed hierarchically: I’ve already described the extent to which 
Cypher embodies this thesis. In that Rowe withholds his own views of musical 
experience, I wonder whether Cypher might not have been implementationally 
richer had he stayed with the tonal theory he cites, if only because such theories 
are all he adduces to illustrate the point about how humans experience music. It’s 
true, all the same, that a tonal Cypher would enjoy much less artistic merit than 
does the present version. Cypher can, at least, perform at international festivals 
of computer music as it stands; a tonal Cypher would have to seek other outlets. 
My second reservation concerns the treatment of interactivity itself. Karaoke, I 
need hardly observe, does not exist for this book’s purposes; nor does any other 
kind of interactivity likely to be of interest to those who don’t compose computer 
music. About the philosophy of interactivity, nothing is said nor, I think, does 
one exist. I’d like to imagine that a whole new way of thinking about music, such 
as interactivity might provide, might give rise to a whole new kind of music, or at 
least a whole new kind of musical performance-perhaps even a whole new way 
of hearing music (hierarchically or otherwise); it’s regrettable that the excerpts on 
the CD sound just the same as non-interactive music, and seem to engage just the 
same attitudes towards performance. The music in this collection is stylistically an 
outgrowth of what, forty years ago, was experimental, progressive and radical; 
maintaining the idiom seems untrue to this music’s own history. We need new 
ideas about what interactivity is or could be, and Interactive Music Systems is not 
helpful in this respect. 
This brings me to my final reservation, which is something of a personal quirk. 
Rowe credits himself with implementing a working system: that this comes at the 
expense of an interesting, or even plausible, theorization of the subject seems to 
me an unfair trade-off. I, for one, would not have minded at all had Cypher’s 
delivery been held up at the drawing board just a bit longer. 
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